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“This book constitutes an examination of, and a contribution to, a discussion conducted within the Catholic theological community since the 1960s
concerning the proper understanding of the apparent interval between
the death of individual human beings and the final consummation of all
created things (typically referred to as the ‘intermediate state’)” (1). So
begins Stephen Yates’s defense of the traditional Roman Catholic view of
the intermediate state and critical analysis of rival views that focus on immediate resurrection. I’m not aware of any other book-length treatment of
the intermediate state and immediate resurrection that draws on Catholic
and Protestant theological and philosophical traditions with such equal
ease. Yates’s book is insightful and wonderfully honest, making clear just
how difficult it is to hold to the traditional view, while also developing
promising avenues of response. Regardless of whether one agrees with
Yates’s judgment in particular cases (I often did not) or the overall position
he reaches (I do not), philosophers and theologians of both Catholic and
Protestant orientations will benefit from this patient and detailed critical
study.
Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the traditional Catholic view of the
intermediate state, what Yates calls “the traditional schema,” as well as
its two main nontraditional rivals. According to the traditional schema,
immediately upon death one’s soul is ushered into the presence of God,
where the person is judged and either rewarded with entrance to heaven
(either immediately or after purification in Purgatory) or punished with
condemnation to hell, and—regardless of one’s eternal destiny—one is
reunited with his or her body in the general resurrection at Christ’s Parousia (1–2). As this very brief summary makes clear, the traditional schema
involves several central commitments, including commitments to a twostaged eschatology, wherein souls are immediately judged after death and
their bodies are raised in the general resurrection, and a dualistic personal
ontology that permits separated souls (animae separatae). It also assumes
that human persons persist through death into the intermediate state and
that the resurrected body is numerically identical to the living pre-mortem
body that perishes (2–3).
For a variety of philosophical and theological reasons, the traditional
schema has come under increasing fire from Catholic philosophers and
theologians. Not only is it arguably inconsistent with the theological
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anthropology of sacred scripture, which seems decidedly monistic, it also
threatens to undermine the substantial unity of human persons and is in
tension with the centrality of bodily resurrection in the eschatological vision of the Church (6). Motivated by worries such as these, some Catholic theologians have explored one or another version of the immediate
resurrection hypothesis (what Yates typically refers to as “resurrection in
death”). According to the first of these, atemporalism, at death human persons pass “‘from time into a timeless eternity, in which the resurrection
has already taken place.’ Death, in other words, leads into the Parousia
and the last day” (8). On the other hand, for nonatemporalism, the second
version of immediate resurrection Yates considers, at death human persons are immediately resurrected into the intermediate state where, as
fully embodied persons, they are judged and then rewarded or punished,
and await the general resurrection (8), where the general resurrection is
here understood as transforming an embodied individual in a way that
completes or enhances her bodily existence (13).
Yates’s analysis of the current state of the debate reveals numerous dialectical lacunae around which he structures the remaining chapters. In so
doing, he seeks to move the debate forward and in this he is largely successful (I say this as a still unrepentant opponent of the traditional schema).
In chapter 2, Yates examines the scriptural evidence for and against the
traditional schema. In chapters 3 and 4, Yates carefully examines and critiques atemporalism and nonatemporalism, respectively, and, finally, in
chapter 5, Yates offers a comprehensive defense of the traditional schema.
Chapter 2 begins with John Cooper’s now standard distinctions between
holistic and monistic anthropologies and two forms of holism, functional
and ontological (34). Following Cooper, Yates argues that sacred scripture
testifies to a dualistic form of functional holism, and not monism, focusing first on Hebrew Scripture (Old Testament), then on the Deutero and
non-canonical literature of the Second Temple period, and finally on the
New Testament literature. To those familiar with the exegetical arguments
developed by Cooper, G. E. Ladd, and Robert Gundry, there is little here
that will surprise the reader. The real highlight of this chapter is Yates’s
very close examination of 2 Corinthians 5: 1–10, a text often used by proponents of immediate resurrection to co-opt Paul as an ally. While such
folks may not be wholly convinced by Yates’s exegesis, they cannot ignore
this important contribution to the debate.
I have two concerns with this chapter that go beyond mere quibbles
and exegetical disagreement. Yates seems to assume that the Hebrew
scriptures (as well as the later Jewish and New Testament texts) speak
with a single voice on matters of theological anthropology. Yet given the
remarkable diversity of thought and seemingly irreconcilable points of
view preserved in the Hebrew Bible on numerous issues central to Israelite
(and, later, to Judean) religious life, practice, and theology, it would be
surprising were it to convey a single, unified eschatological vision of personal and collective destiny. Second, for far too long, Christians (myself
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included) have relied almost exclusively on the same narrow range of
Protestant biblical scholarship on the anthropological and eschatological
views of the Hebrew Bible and early Judaism. This narrow exclusivity
comes at the cost of marginalizing the amazing work being done by Jewish biblical scholars on these issues. Failing to include Jewish scholars in
discussions regarding their sacred scripture and early theological views is
no less problematic than convening an all-male panel to explain women’s
views on their own healthcare. To rectify this problem one could do worse
than by starting with Jon Levenson’s Resurrection and the Restoration of Israel (Yale University Press, 2006).
Yates turns to an examination of atemporalism in chapter 3. According
to this version of the immediate resurrection hypothesis, at death, human
persons are immediately resurrected into the atemporal reality of the
last day, “a timeless eternity which is beyond yet adjacent to time and in
which Parousia, resurrection, last judgment, and cosmic consummation
coincide” (88). Drawing on both philosophical and theological considerations, Yates convincingly argues (to my mind, at least) that atemporalism
offers an inadequate account of the intermediate state. Atemporalism is
found to be problematic on philosophical grounds owing to, among other
things, our having an essentially temporal nature that is inconsistent with
being numerically identical to a person resurrected into atemporal reality.
Theologically, atemporalism does no better as it threatens to undermine
the eschatological significance of history, denying, as it does, that history
culminates in the Parousia. Further, atemporalism stands in serious tension with Catholic faith and practice regarding those in Purgatory, for if
at death a person immediately enters into the general resurrection on the
last day, then there seems to be little logical or temporal space for the penal
purification of Purgatory taught by the Magisterium and presupposed by
the Church’s practices.
An especially delightful aspect of Yates’s discussion in this chapter is
his examination of the metaphysical commitments of the Church’s practices and rituals. In drawing on the Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith’s declaration that “The Church excludes every way of thinking or
speaking that would make meaningless or unintelligible her prayers,
her funeral rites and the religious acts offered for the dead” (114), Yates’s
approach opens exciting new avenues of exploration that may offer us
a way forward after what has too often felt like years of stagnation in intractable debates. Just as positions in personal ontology can be usefully
evaluated in light of their implications for philosophical theology (for example, whether a materialist conception of human persons is consistent
with the incarnation of the Son), so they may also be usefully evaluated
in light of their implications for religious practices (for example, whether
the Church’s practice of praying for the deceased necessitates a dualist
conception of human persons).
Having found atemporalism inadequate, Yates turns, in chapter 4,
to nonatemporalism, according to which at death human persons are
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immediately resurrected into the intermediate state, from which temporal
vantage point the consummation of all things on the Last Day is still yet
to come (8). The nonatemporalist’s insistence on an embodied existence
in the intermediate state raises the issue of how to adequately account for
the numerical identity of the person whose corpse lies before us and the
person who has risen into the intermediate state (127, 131–134). Chapter
4 carefully examines the leading proposals from John Hick, R. T. Herbert,
Charles Hartshorne, Hans Kung, Peter van Inwagen, Karl Rahner, and
others, ultimately finding each of them unsatisfactory. The scope of analysis in this chapter is impressive, the arguments are often compelling, and
it nicely summarizes for Catholic philosophers and theologians an area of
debate that’s too often dominated by their Protestant siblings.
With that said, I was left disappointed. Throughout this chapter, Yates
relies heavily (though certainly not exclusively) on William Hasker’s discussion in The Emergent Self, and this is especially true of his discussion of
Dean Zimmerman and Kevin Corcoran’s “fissioning” model of resurrection, according to which at death the human body undergoes fission in
virtue of the particles composing it coming to stand in immanent causal
relations with two successive sets of particles, one of which compose a
terrestrial corpse and the other of which compose a living body in the intermediate state (163). Hasker objects to this model of resurrection on the
grounds that it entails a closest-continuer account of personal identity and
closest-continuer accounts of personal identity are, he argues, inconsistent
with the necessity of identity, a cost that all parties would deem unacceptably high. The problem is that both Zimmerman and Corcoran have
provided detailed responses to Hasker that are not so much as mentioned
by Yates, much less critically engaged. Granted, one may not like what
Zimmerman and Corcoran say in response to Hasker, but in a book so centrally structured around addressing dialectical lacunae, some of which are
a matter of one side’s failing to address an objection or failing to address
a reply to an objection made by the other side, it was disappointing to see
the author merely repeat Hasker’s criticism with no further consideration
of the matter. I have related worries regarding Yates’s discussion of the relation between spatiotemporal continuity and the persistence of ordinary
material objects (e.g., 139), but space precludes pursuing them here.
The inadequacy of immediate resurrection sets up Yates’s claim in chapter 5 that only a personal ontology including separated souls is able to
ground both a person’s continued existence in the intermediate state and
the numerical identity of her living, pre-mortem body and her resurrection body (213). The main burden of the chapter is to address a cornucopia
of objections to the traditional schema and here the book really shines.
This is easily the strongest (as well as the longest) chapter of the book. In
the first half, Yates addresses challenges to the traditional schema based
on the seeming incoherence of a separated soul, the problem of individuating separated souls, accounting for the possibility of a separated soul’s
cognitive activity, and the trouble with securing a role for the separated
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soul in personal identity. For the sake of space, I’ll focus on the last of
these issues. Yates argues that the persistence of a separated soul is able to
ground personal identity through death, disembodiment in the intermediate state, and resurrection by drawing on a notion of partial existence
that allows him to deny that existence is “all or nothing” (201 ff.). Such a
view, he argues, opens up the possibility of holding that while only a part
of the person survives her death, it follows neither that the person ceases
to exist full stop nor that the person experiences a break in continuity that
would threaten the identification of the resurrected person with the person who died.
This section of the chapter not only goes a long way toward resolving
the tension between a Thomistic anthropology and human persistence
through death and resurrection, it also presents an original and important contribution to the dispute between survivalists and corruptionists
and ought to be carefully considered by all parties to that debate. I only
wish that Yates had engaged a wider range of scholars currently working
on these issues. With a few exceptions (for example, Robert Pasnau, with
whom Yates extensively interacts), Yates tends to engage only scholarship that’s at least twenty years old. Yes, there are passing references to
more recent work (Patrick Toner, Eleonore Stump, and John Madden are
three examples), but many scholars who’ve made central contributions
to the debate over Thomistic anthropology and post-mortem survival
are entirely ignored. Certainly, as Yates notes (213), one cannot consider
everything written on a given topic, but in what may well be a golden
age of Thomistic scholarship, one would expect greater interaction with
recent work. This is especially true with regard to Jeffrey Brower, David
Oderberg, and Eleonore Stump, all of whom have offered philosophically
sophisticated discussions connecting mereological considerations (of the
sort relevant for Yates’s discussion) and disembodied survival.
In the second half of the chapter, Yates addresses a tension between the
ontologically incomplete nature of the separated soul that experiences the
beatific vision and the centrality of the resurrection of the body to Catholic eschatology (215). In affirming that the separated soul experiences the
beatific vision, it seems to follow that it experiences perfect beatitude (understood as perfectly complete joy or bliss) and, since perfect beatitude
entails the satisfaction of all desires, it seems to follow that any increase in
quantity or intensity of beatitude is impossible for separated souls experiencing the beatific vision (235). The problem is that this conjunction of
views is seemingly incompatible with the ontologically incomplete nature
of the separated soul, for which union with its body would increase beatitude in some way.
To resolve this tension, Yates distinguishes between subjective and
objective beatitude, the former being understood as a subjective experience of joy or bliss and the latter in terms of the glorification of the holy
individual. This distinction enables Yates to accept the claim that being
the subject of the beatific vision entails experiencing perfect beatitude,
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understood subjectively, while rejecting that claim when understood objectively. Subjectively, a subject of the beatific vision cannot experience any
increase or augmentation of beatitude; objectively, on the other hand, the
subject’s beatitude (now understood as glory) can be increased through
union with its body (236). I found this solution compelling and elegant,
especially regarding its fit with the Church’s grand eschatological vision
of the restoration and glorification of all creation on the Last Day.
Despite some minor weakness (some I’ve mentioned, others I’ve not),
Stephen Yates has given readers a delightful and often compelling defense
of the traditional Catholic view of the intermediate state and critique of its
rivals. Any scholar working on these issues, Catholic or Protestant, should
have Between Death and Resurrection on their shelf.

